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ARTICLES
REVISITING THE AMBIGUITY OF
"AND" AND "OR" IN LEGAL DRAFTING
KENNETH A. ADAMSt & ALAN S. KAYEtt
INTRODUCTION
Most general works on legal drafting contain a discussion of
ambiguity, and usually such discussions touch on the ambiguity
associated with the words and and or.' Treatment of this topic
has, however, been characterized by oversimplification and error.
This is not without consequence, as an element of this flawed
analysis has made its way into case law. 2
The analysis offered in Barbara Child's Drafting Legal
Documents: Principles and Practices is representative. To
illustrate the ambiguity of and and or, it offers three examples,
the first two involving or and the third involving and.3 But in
the first example, 4 the emphasized or is in fact not ambiguous;
this example just demonstrates that drafters sometimes use or
when the better choice would be and.5 The second example 6 does
t Lecturer in law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and consultant
and speaker on contract drafting. With the permission of the American Bar
Association, this article is an expanded version of part of chapter 8 of A Manual of
Style for Contract Drafting by Professor Adams, © 2004 by the American Bar
Association.
tt Professor of English, Comparative Literature, and Linguistics, and Director of
the Laboratory of Phonetic Research at California State University, Fullerton.
1 See, e.g., BARBARA CHILD, DRAFTING LEGAL DOCUMENTS: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES 323-29 (2d ed. 1992); ROBERT C. DICK, LEGAL DRAFTING IN PLAIN
LANGUAGE 104-05 (3d ed. 1995); F. REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
LEGAL DRAFTING § 6.2, at 104-14 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter FLD2]; BRYAN A.
GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 624 (2d ed. 1995); THOMAS R.
HAGGARD, LEGAL DRAFTING IN A NUTSHELL 259-68 (2003).
2 See infra text following note 79.
3 See CHILD, supra note 1, at 323-25.
4 See id. at 323 ("I certify that I have read the names of the above listed
organizations, and that I am not now, nor have I ever been, a member of, in
association with, or affiliated with, or that I have not contributed to any of such
organizations, except as indicated and explained below.")
5 See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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exhibit ambiguity, but it is caused not by the emphasized or but
by uncertainty as to whether the closing modifier is compensation
for soliciting for her or for her.7 And in the third example,8 the
and is not ambiguous; this example just demonstrates that
drafters sometimes use and when the better choice would be or.9
The authors thought it appropriate to reexamine the
ambiguity engendered in legal drafting by and and or, and to do
so in a way that reflects linguists' understanding of the subject
and explores how ambiguity varies depending on the
grammatical context.
After defining ambiguity and distinguishing it from
vagueness, and after considering the significance of context, this
article examines the ambiguity engendered by plural nouns, a
topic that is closely related to the ambiguity of and and or. It
then discusses in turn the ambiguity engendered by and and by
or and closes with a discussion of and/or and the ambiguity of
and used in conjunction with or. Any marked divergence from
analyses offered elsewhere in the literature on legal drafting is
noted.
To illustrate the analysis, this article contains numbered
example sentences. Each such sentence that is ambiguous is
followed by one or more italicized sentences that convey its
alternative meanings, in the following manner:
[0] Each numbered example in regular font is either
ambiguous or unambiguous.
[Oa] Each numbered-and-lettered example in italics represents
one of the possible meanings of the immediately preceding
ambiguous numbered example.
I. AMBIGUITY AND VAGUENESS
A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of having
two or more meanings.10
6 See CHILD, supra note 1, at 324 ("Any male person ... who solicits or receives
compensation for soliciting for her, is guilty of pimping, a felony ... ").
7 See KENNETH A. ADAMS, A MANUAL OF STYLE FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING
8.134-35 (2004) (discussing ambiguity caused by opening and closing modifiers).
8 See CHILD, supra note 1, at 324 ("No person shall.., use obscene, profane,
vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent language, suggestions or proposals of an obscene
nature and threats of any kind whatsoever.") (emphasis in the original).
9 See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
10 See GARNER, supra note 1, at 48.
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Ambiguity is to be distinguished from vagueness, which is a
function of imprecision rather than alternative meanings.
Whereas vagueness is a standard drafting tool, an ambiguity will
generally go unnoticed, at least until sometime after signing.
And ambiguity is pernicious: it can render illusory what the
parties had thought to be a meeting of the minds, or it can be
used by one of the parties to accomplish that after the fact.1"
II. CONTEXT
The shortcomings in analyses of and and or in the literature
on legal drafting are largely due to commentators having paid
insufficient attention to grammatical context. The category of
contract language involved, where in the sentence the and and or
coordination occurs, what part of speech occurs on either side of
the coordination, and other such factors are relevant to
determining the meaning associated with and and or.
Determining how these various elements interact is
challenging, so it is not surprising that commentators on legal
drafting should have instead opted to offer simplistic analyses
that suggest that any ambiguity is inherent in the words and and
or themselves. 12 From there it is but a small step to assuming,
incorrectly, that ambiguity lurks in each instance of and and or.'3
III. PLURAL NOUNS
Sentences containing plural nouns can be unambiguous-for
example, The Acme Subsidiaries are Delaware corporations. In
many sentences, however, a plural noun can engender ambiguity,
with the nature and extent of the ambiguity being a function of
context. Plural nouns engender three kinds of ambiguity: First,
uncertainty regarding whether the members of a group are
acting, or being acted on, individually or collectively. Second, if
the members of a group are acting or being acted on individually,
uncertainty regarding whether they must all act, or be acted on,
in unison. And third, and more narrowly, uncertainty regarding
whether a plural direct object relates to each member of a plural
11 ADAMS, supra note 7, 8.1, at 115 (internal citations omitted).
12 See infra notes 17-20, 33-35 and accompanying text.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 52-54 and following note 88.
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subject considered separately or to all members considered as a
whole. ' 4
A. Subject Ambiguity
When a plural noun is the subject of a sentence that uses
any category of contract language15 other than language of
discretion, as in [1] (which uses language of obligation), it can be
unclear whether the persons or things constituting the subject
are to act individually, as in [la], or collectively, as in [1b]. Often
when a contract requires that parties act collectively, an agent is
appointed to act on their behalf. That reduces the potential for
ambiguity of the sort exhibited by [1].
[1] The Stockholders shall notify Acme.
[la] Each Stockholder shall notify Acme.
[1b] The Stockholders, acting collectively, shall notify Acme.
In the case of language of discretion, there are additional
possible meanings. Imposing an obligation on each member of a
group, as in [la], has the same effect as imposing that obligation
on all members of that group. By contrast, saying that the
members of a group have discretion to take a given action could
mean either (1) that any given member may take that action
irrespective of whether any other member takes that action (see
[2a]) or (2) that no member may take that action unless all
members do (see [2b]).
[2] The Stockholders may notify Acme.
[2a] Any Stockholder may notify Acme.
[2b] No fewer than all Stockholders may notify Acme.
[2c] The Stockholders, acting collectively, may notify Acme.
B. Direct-Object Ambiguity
When a plural noun is other than the subject of a sentence,
the potential ambiguity is similar to the ambiguity that arises
14 See infra example [7].
15 See ADAMS, supra note 7, ch. 3 (discussing the categories of contract
language-language of obligation, discretion, prohibition, policy, and
representation-as well as how to express conditions in conjunction with categories
of contract language).
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when a plural noun is the subject. See [3], in which the plural
noun serves as the direct object. When, however, it does not
make sense to distinguish between treating the persons or things
constituting the direct object individually or collectively, the
potential number of meanings is reduced accordingly. For
example, whereas [3b] is one of the possible meanings of [3],
because giving a single notice could serve to notify a group, no
analogous meaning is possible in the case of [4].
[3] Acme shall notify the Stockholders.
[3a] Acme shall notify each of the Stockholders.
[3b] Acme shall notify the Stockholders, considered collectively.
[4] Acme shall sell the Shares.
As is the case when the plural noun is the subject of the
sentence, the potential number of meanings in [3] increases when
the sentence is expressed using language of discretion: when the
members of the object group are considered individually rather
than collectively, it is not clear whether the subject has discretion
to act with regard to all the members, as in [5a], or some or all of
them, as in [5b]. The same ambiguity is present when one
restates [4] using language of discretion (see [6]).
[5] Acme may notify the Stockholders.
[5a] Acme may notify no fewer than all Stockholders.
[5b] Acme may notify one or more Stockholders.
[5c] Acme may notify the Stockholders, considered collectively.
[6] Acme may sell the Shares.
[6a] Acme may sell no fewer than all the Shares.
[6b] Acme may sell one or more Shares.
C. Subject-and-Direct-Object Ambiguity
When both the subject and the direct object are plural nouns,
it can be unclear whether the plural direct object relates to each
member of the plural subject considered separately or to all
members considered as a whole. In the case of [7], the question
is whether each Stockholder is required to submit one
questionnaire or more than one. Often it will be clear from the
context which is the intended meaning.
2006] 1171
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[7] The Stockholders shall promptly submit the completed
questionnaires.
[7a] Each Stockholder shall promptly submit a completed
questionnaire.
[7b] Each Stockholder shall promptly submit the completed
questionnaires.
IV. "AND"
Related to the ambiguity caused by plural nouns is that
engendered by nouns or adjectives linked by and.
And conveys conjunction, with items linked by and being
considered together. 16 Sentences containing nouns linked by and
can be unambiguous-an example is Acme and Widgetco are
Delaware corporations. But and can also engender ambiguity.
And can convey that the members of a group are to be
considered together, but it can also convey that they are to be
considered together and separately. Furthermore, it can be
unclear whether nouns linked by and are acting, or are being
acted on, individually or collectively. (The latter kind of
ambiguity also arises in connection with plural nouns). 17
Authorities on drafting recognize the former kind of
ambiguity,'8 but they gloss over the fact that whether and is
ambiguous, and in what way, depends entirely on the
grammatical context. The subtleties involved bring into question
how Dickerson can assert that "in most cases . . . 'and' is used in
the several rather than the joint sense"' 9 and that therefore in
the absence of special circumstances drafters can rely on and to
convey the sense of together or separately.20
A. Subject Ambiguity
When nouns linked by and constitute the subject of a
16 See RODNEY HUDDLESTON & GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, THE CAMBRIDGE
GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE § 2.2, at 1293 (2002) [hereinafter CGEL]
(stating that "[w]ith and we are concerned with a set in its totality").
17 See supra text preceding note 14.
18 See FLD2, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 105 (distinguishing the "several" and-A
and B, jointly or severally-and the "joint" and-A and B, jointly and not severally);
GARNER, supra note 1, at 624 (same).
19 FLD2, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 106.
20 See id.
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sentence using any category of contract language other than
language of discretion, as in [8] (which uses language of
obligation), it can be unclear whether the persons or things
constituting the subject are to be considered individually, as in
[8a], or collectively, as in [8b]. (Note that the ambiguity in [8] is
analogous to that in [1]).
[8] Able and Baker shall notify Acme.
[8a] Able and Baker shall each notify Acme.
[8b] Able and Baker, acting collectively, shall notify Acme.
Language of discretion gives rise to greater ambiguity than
does language of obligation. (Note that the ambiguity in [9] is
analogous to that in [2]).
[9] Able and Baker may notify Acme.
[9a] Both Able and Baker, as opposed to one or the other of
them, may notify Acme.
[9b] Able or Baker, or both of them, may notify Acme.
[9c] Able and Baker, acting collectively, may notify Acme.
B. Direct-Object Ambiguity
A similar range of potential meanings arises when nouns
linked by and are other than the subject of the sentence. See, for
example, [10] where nouns linked by and serve as direct objects.
When, however, the persons or things constituting direct objects
cannot be considered collectively, as in [11], the potential
ambiguity is reduced accordingly.
[10] Acme shall notify Able and Baker.
[10a] Acme shall notify both Able and Baker.
[10b] Acme shall notify Able and Baker, considered collectively.
[11] Acme shall dissolve Subsidiary A and Subsidiary B.
As with [8], the number of potential meanings conveyed by
[10] increases when it is expressed using language of discretion;
when the members of the object group are considered
individually rather than collectively, it is not clear whether the
subject has discretion to act with regard to all the members, as in
2006] 1173
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[12a], or some or all of them, as in [12b]. The same ambiguity is
present when one restates [11] using language of discretion; see
[13].
[12] Acme may notify Able and Baker.
[12a] Acme may notify both Able and Baker, as opposed to one or
the other of them.
[12b] Acme may notify either Able or Baker, or both of them.
[12c] Acme may notify Able and Baker, considered collectively.
[13] Acme may dissolve Subsidiary A and Subsidiary B.
[13a] Acme may dissolve both Subsidiary A and Subsidiary B,
as opposed to one or the other of them.
[13b] Acme may dissolve one or both of Subsidiary A and
Subsidiary B.
A range of ambiguity comparable to that in [12] and [13]
arises when instead one uses language of prohibition, as in [14]
and [15]. The more natural meaning of [14] and [15] is conveyed
by [14a] and [15a], respectively. 21 If you wish to convey the
meaning in [14b] or [15b], you should not rely on [14] or [15] to do
so.
[14] Acme shall not notify Able and Baker.
[14a] Acme shall not notify Able and shall not notify Baker.
[14b] Acme shall not notify both Able and Baker but may notify
one or the other of them.
[14c] Acme shall not notify Able and Baker, considered
collectively.
[15] Acme shall not dissolve Subsidiary A and Subsidiary B.
[15a] Acme shall not dissolve Subsidiary A and shall not
dissolve Subsidiary B.
[15b] Acme shall not dissolve both Subsidiary A and Subsidiary
B but may dissolve one or the other of them.
21 See CGEL, supra note 16 § 2.2.2, at 1298-99 (stating that more often than not
a subclausal and-coordination will have scope over a negative, with the natural
interpretation of I'm not free on Saturday and Sunday being "I'm free on Saturday
and I'm not free on Sunday," although an alternative reading-particularly if the
and is stressed-would be "I'm not free on both days").
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C. Subject-and-Direct- Object Ambiguity
Example [16] demonstrates the ambiguity found in [8], but,
in addition, it is unclear whether the and-coordination of the
subjects is "distributive" (as in [16a]) or "joint" (as in [16b]). 22 In
other words, it is unclear whether each of the subjects is to notify
one or both of the objects.
[161 Able and Baker shall notify Acme and Widgetco.
[16a] Able and Baker shall each notify Acme and Widgetco.
[16b] Able and Baker shall notify Acme and Widgetco,
respectively.
[16c] Able and Baker, acting collectively, shall notify Acme and
Widgetco.
D. Multiple Verb Phrases
A variant of the ambiguity present in [12] occurs when in
language of discretion the subject and a single may are used with
two verb phrases, as in [17]. Using may in each verb phrase, as
in [17b], would make it clear that Acme's discretion is not limited
to either selling assets and making capital expenditures or doing
neither. [17c] accomplishes the same goal. When there are three
or more verb phrases, it may be most efficient to express this
meaning by stating that the subject may do any one or more of
the following.
[17] Acme may sell assets and make capital expenditures.
[17a] Acme may sell assets and make capital expenditures, but
not one or the other.
[17b] Acme may sell assets and may make capital expenditures.
[17c] Acme may sell assets or make capital expenditures, or it
may do both.
When the first verb phrase logically leads to the second, it is
likely that the sense together and not separately is intended, as in
[18] .23
22 See id. § 1.3.2, at 1282 (stating that the example Kim and Pat are studying
law and economics "has not only the distributive reading 'Kim is studying law and
economics, and Pat is studying law and economics,' but also the joint one 'Kim and
Pat are studying law and economics respectively' ").
23 Cf. id. § 2.2.3, at 1300 (concerning asymmetric constructions, with X and Y
implicating X and then Y).
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[18] Widgetco may terminate Subsidiary A and liquidate its
assets.
E. Object-Predicative Ambiguity
When nouns separated by and function as objects predicative
of a sentence, as do Echo and Foxtrot in [19], [20], and [21], the
ambiguity can be analogous to that exhibited in [10], [12], and
[141.
[19] Delta shall issue a promissory note to Echo and Foxtrot.
[19a] Delta shall issue a promissory note to each of Echo and
Foxtrot.
[19b] Delta shall issue a promissory note to Echo and Foxtrot
jointly.
[20] Delta may issue a promissory note to Echo and Foxtrot.
[20a] Delta may issue a promissory note to both Echo and
Foxtrot, as opposed to one or the other.
[20b] Delta may issue a promissory note to Echo, to Foxtrot, or to
each of them.
[20c] Delta may issue a promissory note to Echo and Foxtrot
jointly.
[21] Delta shall not issue a promissory note to Echo and
Foxtrot.
[21a] Delta shall not issue a promissory note to each of Echo and
Foxtrot, as opposed to one or the other.
[2 1b] Delta shall not issue a promissory note to Echo or Foxtrot.
[21c] Delta shall not issue a promissory note to Echo and
Foxtrot jointly.
When, however, the objects predicative are mutually
exclusive and so cannot be considered collectively, there is
reduced scope for ambiguity. Because it would not be possible to
construct a factory that is located in both California and Florida,
the language of obligation in [22] is unambiguous and the
language of discretion in [23] and language of prohibition in [24]
exhibit fewer possible meanings than the analogous [20] and [21].
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[22] Acme shall construct a factory in California and Florida.
[23] Acme may construct a factory in California and Florida.
[23a] Acme may construct a factory in California, in Florida, or
in both states.
[23b] Acme may construct a factory in both California and
Florida, as opposed to in one state or the other.
[24] Acme shall not construct a factory in California and
Florida.
[24a] Acme shall not construct a factory in California or in
Florida.
[24b] Acme shall not construct a factory in both California and
Florida, as opposed to in one or the other.
F. The Effect of Adjectives
Another form of ambiguity associated with and is that which
derives from (1) adjectives that modify a noun and are linked by
and (as in temporary and part-time employees) and (2) nouns that
are modified by adjectives and linked by and (as in temporary
employees and part-time employees).24
Here is an example of the basic potential meanings of a
plural noun modified by two adjectives:
[25] temporary and part-time employees
[25a] employees who are temporary and employees who are part-
time
[25b] employees, each of whom is both temporary and part-time
The ambiguity that actually arises in a provision using a
plural noun modified by adjectives joined by and is, however, a
function of context and of which kind of contract language is
used. In lieu of giving examples of each of the many
permutations, below are two examples; [26] uses language of
obligation and [27] uses language of discretion. [27] exhibits a
greater number of possible meanings than does [26] due to the
ambiguity associated with plural nouns, namely (1) whether the
members of a group are acting, or being acted on, individually or
collectively, and (2) if the members of a group are acting or being
24 See FLD2, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 109-14.
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acted upon individually, whether they must all act, or be acted
upon, in unison.25
[26] Tango shall terminate the employment of Acme's
temporary and part-time employees.
[26a] Tango shall terminate the employment of those Acme
employees who are temporary and those Acme employees
who are part-time.
[26b] Tango shall terminate the employment of those Acme
employees who are both temporary and part-time.
[27] Tango may terminate the employment of Acme's
temporary and part-time employees.
[27a] Tango may terminate the employment of no fewer than all
Acme employees who are temporary and no fewer than all
Acme employees who are part-time. Tango may not
terminate all the employees in one group without also
terminating all the employees in the other group.
[27b] Tango may terminate the employment of one or both of the
following: (1) no fewer than all Acme employees who are
temporary and (2) no fewer than all Acme employees who
are part-time.
[27c] Tango may terminate the employment of no fewer than all
Acme employees who are both temporary and part-time.
[27d] Tango may terminate the employment of any Acme
employees who are both temporary and part-time.
[27e] Tango may terminate the employment of (1) one or more
Acme employees who are temporary and (2) one or more
Acme employees who are part-time.
There is no ambiguity when adjectives linked by and are
mutually exclusive (hospital and burial expenses;26 damaged and
intact widgets; federal, state, and local laws), are inextricably
linked (due and payable notes), or represent sequential steps in a
process (inspected and certified widgets).
If one were to apply the analysis that Dickerson offers in an
analogous context,27 one would posit that [25a] is ambiguous, in
that it raises the question whether one can cumulate attributes-
in other words, whether an employee who is both temporary and
25 See supra text preceding note 14.
26 See FLD2, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 109-10.
27 See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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part-time would fall within both the group of temporary
employees and the group of part-time employees or would be
excluded from each group for having both attributes. But in the
example discussed below, 28 the issue of cumulation of attributes
is extrinsic to the meaning conveyed by [25a], and one has no
basis for concluding that an employee who is both temporary and
part-time would be excluded from both groups.
An alternative to having a noun modified by two or more
adjectives is to repeat the noun with each adjective, as in [28].
This has the effect of eliminating the ambiguity exhibited in [25],
because one meaning that is not possible is employees who are
both temporary and part-time. But due to the ambiguity
associated with plural nouns, 29 ambiguity would result if [28]
were used with language of discretion the way [25] is used in
[27] .30
[28] temporary employees and part-time employees
G. The Ambiguity of "Every X and Y"
When every is used before two or more nouns that are linked
by and, another kind of ambiguity results. 31 In [29], the question
arises whether every director and every officer is entitled to
indemnification, or whether only persons who are both a director
and an officer are entitled to indemnification. Context will often
suggest the intended meaning; in the case of [29], the intended
meaning is presumably that expressed in [29a] rather than that
expressed in [29b].
[29] Acme shall indemnify every director and officer of
Widgetco.
[29a] Acme shall indemnify every director and every officer of
Widgetco.
[29b] Acme shall indemnify every person who is both a director
and an officer of Widgetco.
28 See infra text accompanying note 64.
29 See supra example [5].
30 See FLD2, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 112 (stating that the two possible meanings
of "charitable institutions and educational institutions" are a function of whether the
phrase is used with "mandatory" or "permissive" language).
31 See id. § 6.2, at 107; HAGGARD, supra note 1, at 260-61.
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V. "OR"
Or introduces alternatives. 32 But since at least the time of
publication of Dickerson's Fundamentals of Legal Drafting,33
authorities on legal drafting have stated that or is ambiguous, in
that it can be "inclusive," meaning A or B, or both, or it can be
"exclusive," meaning A or B, but not both.34 Dickerson goes so far
as to state that "in most cases 'or' is used in the inclusive rather
than the exclusive sense" and that, therefore, in the absence of
special circumstances drafters can rely on or to convey the sense
of "A or B or both."35 (The authors suggest below how this view of
the inclusive and exclusive or arose).36
The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language37
(referred to here as "CGEL") represents the most recent attempt
at a comprehensive descriptive grammar of English. It offers a
more detailed analysis of or than can be found in the literature
on legal drafting.
CGEL notes that "[t]he collective and alternative relations
expressed by and and or ... correspond closely to the relations
known to logicians as conjunction and disjunction."38  In
considering or, CGEL notes that logicians distinguish two kinds
of disjunction: inclusive and exclusive disjunction. The
disjunction of P and Q is inclusive if and only if at least one of the
propositions P and Q is true. The disjunction of P and Q is
exclusive if and only if only one of P and Q is true. 39
CGEL goes on to state that "or expresses inclusive
disjunction but that a statement with the form 'P or Q' is
typically interpreted as carrying the implicature 'P and Q are not
both true.' "40 That is because "we don't generally say 'P or Q' if
we know 'P and Q' to be true .... The most likely reason for
32 See CGEL, supra note 16, § 2.2, at 1293 ("[W]ith or the members of the set are
regarded as alternatives.").
33 F. REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 76 (1965)
[hereinafter FLD1]; see also FLD2, supra note 1, at 104.
34 See DICK, supra note 1, at 104-05; GARNER, supra note 1, at 624; HAGGARD,
supra note 1, at 263-64; Maurice B. Kirk, Legal Drafting: The Ambiguity of "And"
and "Or," 2 TEX. TECH L. REV. 235, 237-38 (1971).
35 FLD2, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 106.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
37 CGEL, supra note 16.
38 Id. § 2.2.1, at 1294 (emphasis omitted).
39 See id.
40 Id. § 2.2.1, at 1295.
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saying 'P or Q' rather than 'P and Q', therefore, is that the latter
would be false, which leads to the 'not and' implicature."4
Consequently, "if I intend to invite Kim and Pat to dinner, it is
normally misleading to say I'll invite Kim or Pat to dinner."42 Of
course, when the alternatives joined by or are mutually exclusive
(He was born on Christmas Day in 1950 or 1951), there is no
need to rely on this implicature."
But CGEL offers two other reasons for saying P or Q rather
than P and Q. The first is that the speaker may know that one
or the other of P and Q is true, but does not know whether both
are. 44 As an example, GCEL offers Either the mailman hasn't got
here yet or there's no mail for us today.45 A second reason for
saying P or Q rather than P and Q arises when the speaker is
presenting a choice and it does not matter to the speaker which
alternative is chosen.46 CGEL offers as an example They are
obtainable at Coles or Woolworths. Presupposing that both stores
stock the item, you have a choice between obtaining them at
Coles and obtaining them at Woolworths. 47 Alternatively, the
meaning "but not both" is intended-They are obtainable at one
or other of Coles and Woolworths, but I don't know (can't
remember) which.48
So while commentators on legal drafting suggest that every
or has the potential to be either inclusive or exclusive, and
generally conveys the exclusive meaning,49 CGEL states that or
is typically used when the drafter wants to convey that only one
of the propositions is correct-in effect, wants the or to be
exclusive. 50
The discrepancy between these analyses is enhanced when
one considers that the two categories of speech that would allow
P or Q to be interpreted as meaning something other than P and
41 Id. § 2.2.1, at 1297.
42 Id.
43 See id. § 2.2.1, at 1295-96.
44 See id.
45 Id. § 2.2.1, at 1295.
46 See id. § 2.2.1, at 1297.
47 See id.
48 Id. § 2.2.1, at 1297 n.17.
49 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
50 See CGEL, supra note 16, § 2.2.1, at 1294.
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Q are not both true5' represent casual speech that is unlikely to
apply in the rigid context of legal drafting.
The approach offered in the literature on legal drafting can
lead one astray. For example, one authority offers as an example
of the ambiguous or the phrase "a $500 fine or ten days in jail"
and asks: "Does this mean that the judge can impose the fine or
the term in jail, but not both? Or can the judge impose both?"52
According to CGEL, the normal interpretation would be that the
legislature intended to convey that only one of the propositions-
the fine or the jail term-was correct, and there is no basis for
suggesting that this language conveys the meaning or both. To
be able to impose both the fine and the jail term, one would need
to add or both to the end of the phrase.
Another commentator with an expansive view of the
inclusive or is Bryan Garner, 53 who recently offered the following
analysis of the ambiguous or: "If you are offered coffee or tea,
you may pick either (or, in this case, neither), or you may for
whatever reason order both. This is the ordinary sense of the
word, understood by everyone and universally accommodated by
the simple or."54
But if in response to the question Would you like coffee or
tea? you say that you would like both, that does not mean that
the question was equivalent to your interrogator's asking
whether you wanted coffee, tea, or both. Instead, if you feel free
to respond that you would like both, that is because although you
know that in this context or introduces an alternative, you have
decided that you would in fact like both coffee and tea and that,
given the casual setting, it would be unduly rigid of you to take
your interrogator at his or her word and opt for only a cup of tea
or a cup of coffee. The authors concur with CGEL when it states
that both "is not a possible answer" to the question Would you
like tea or coffee?55
In fact, Would you like coffee or tea? represents an
unfortunate choice of sentence for advancing the cause of the
inclusive or, because the inherent exclusiveness of or noted by
CGEL is buttressed in that phrase by the fact that ordering both
51 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
52 HAGGARD, supra note 1, at 263.
53 See GARNER, supra note 1, at 624.
54 BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER'S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 45 (2d ed. 2003).
55 See CGEL, supra note 16, § 2.2.1, at 1298.
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coffee and tea for oneself would be decidedly eccentric. The
converse is true for a potential follow-up question, Would you like
milk or sugar? Because having one's coffee or tea with both milk
and sugar is such a standard alternative to having just milk or
just sugar, whoever is posing the question is entitled to assume
that it will be understood that or both is implicit in the question.
Similarly, anyone encountering a rule stating that patrons may
take their coffee with milk or sugar would likely assume that it
was not intended to frustrate any patron wishing to take both
milk and sugar. In this respect, the phrase a $500 fine or ten
days in jail56 is more neutral and so is better suited to assessing
the meaning of or.
The foregoing analysis shows that for purposes of contract
drafting, or serves to distinguish alternatives, and it is untenable
to seek to attribute, across the board, an inclusive meaning to or.
For a proper understanding of the ambiguity associated with or,
one must explore the different grammatical contexts in which or
is used. This demonstrates that the ambiguity is of two sorts
(setting aside anomalies of the milk or sugar variety). First, it
arises when a plural noun is associated with an or-coordination:
it is unclear whether all the items in question are to be
attributed to one coordinate or the other, or can be divided
between them. Second, it occurs in the context of negation,
including, most pertinently, language of prohibition, and only in
this context can one correctly speak of ambiguity-albeit
limited-as to whether or is exclusive or inclusive.
A. Subject Ambiguity
When nouns linked by or constitute the subject of a sentence,
there is no ambiguity when the direct object is singular, as is the
case in [30] (using language of obligation) and [31] (using
language of discretion).
[30] Able or Baker shall submit a claim form to Charlie.
[31] Able or Baker may submit a claim form to Charlie.
56 See supra text accompanying note 52.
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Ambiguity arises when the direct object is plural, not only in
language of obligation, as in [32], but also in other categories of
contract language.
[32] Able or Baker shall submit invoices to Charlie.
[32a] Able or Baker shall submit invoices to Charlie, with all
invoices being submitted by the same person.
[32b] Able or Baker shall submit invoices to Charlie, with any
invoice being submitted by either Able or Baker.
If one or more of the nouns linked by or is a plural noun (as
in the Purchasers and the Sellers), the ambiguity would be
compounded by that associated with plural nouns. 57
B. Direct-Object Ambiguity
When the object consists of singular nouns separated by or,
there is no ambiguity in language of obligation, as in [33], or
language of discretion, as in [34]. Ambiguity does, however, arise
in language of prohibition, as in [35], although the more likely
interpretation is [35a].58
[33] Acme shall dissolve Subsidiary A or Subsidiary B.
[34] Acme may dissolve Subsidiary A or Subsidiary B.
[35] Acme shall not dissolve Subsidiary A or Subsidiary B.
[35a] Acme shall not dissolve Subsidiary A and shall not
dissolve Subsidiary B.
[35b] Acme shall not dissolve one or the other of Subsidiary A or
Subsidiary B, but may dissolve both of them.
And ambiguity arises when the nouns linked by or are
plural. For example, in [36], which uses language of obligation, it
57 See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
58 See CGEL, supra note 16, § 2.2.2, at 1299 (stating that generally a subclausal
or-coordination falls within the scope of a preceding negative but that "wide scope
readings are often possible as less likely interpretations," and noting with respect to
He wasn't at work on Monday or Tuesday that "[t]he salient interpretation is 'He
wasn't at work on Monday and he wasn't at work on Tuesday,' but it can also be read
as 'On Monday or Tuesday (I can't remember precisely which day it was) he wasn't
at work' ").
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is uncertain whether each group of fruit should be considered
collectively. This ambiguity also arises in language of discretion.
[36] Roe shall sell apples or oranges.
[36a] Roe shall sell either apples or oranges, and once Roe sells
either an orange or an apple, Roe shall not thereafter sell
any of the other kind of fruit.
[36b] At any given time Roe shall sell either apples or oranges,
but not both.
C. Object-Predicative Ambiguity
When nouns separated by or function as objects predicative
of a sentence, there is no ambiguity if the direct object is singular
and one uses language of obligation, as in [37], or language of
discretion, as in [38]. By contrast, when one uses language of
prohibition, as in [39], the or could be either exclusive or
inclusive, although the inclusive meaning, as in [39b], is the
more likely. 59 (In [37], [38], and [39], Delta is the subject,
promissory note the object, and Echo and Foxtrot objects
predicative.)
[37] Delta shall issue a promissory note to Echo or Foxtrot.
[38] Delta may issue a promissory note to Echo or Foxtrot.
[39] Delta shall not issue a promissory note to Echo or Foxtrot.
[39a] Delta shall not issue a promissory note to either or both of
Echo or Foxtrot.
[39b] Delta shall not issue a promissory note to either Echo or
Foxtrot, as opposed to both of them.
But ambiguity does arise in language of obligation when the
direct object is plural, as in [40], due to uncertainty as to whether
the items constituting the direct object are to be considered
individually or collectively. (The same ambiguity arises with
language of discretion.) This ambiguity is analogous to that in
[32].
59 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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[40] Delta shall issue promissory notes to Echo or Foxtrot.
[40a] Delta shall issue promissory notes to Echo or Foxtrot, with
one or other of them being issued all the promissory notes.
[40b] Delta shall issue promissory notes to Echo or Foxtrot, with
any promissory note being issued to either Echo or Foxtrot.
D. The Effect of Adjectives
As is the case with and,60 another form of ambiguity
associated with or is that which derives from (1) adjectives that
modify a noun and are linked by or (temporary or part-time
employees) and (2) nouns that are modified by adjectives and
linked by or (temporary employees or part-time employees).
The following example demonstrates the potential meanings
conveyed by a plural noun modified by two adjectives joined by
or. The ambiguity derives from the plural noun.61
[41] temporary or part-time employees
[41a] employees, each of whom is either temporary or part-time
[41b] employees who are temporary or employees who are part-
time
Example [41] is similar to an example offered by Dickerson
("charitable or educational institutions"), except that he states
that his example conveys four alternative meanings, the
additional two meanings deriving from uncertainty as to whether
one can cumulate attributes. 62 Applying Dickerson's analysis to
[41a], the question would be whether an employee who is both
temporary and part-time would fall within the scope of the
example, or whether instead the employee would have to be
temporary or part-time, but not both. 63
This second inquiry does not, however, relate to ambiguity.
In the case of mutually exclusive adjectives (such as hospital or
60 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
61 See supra text accompanying note 14.
62 See FLD1, supra note 33, at 83; FLD2, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 111; see also
Kirk, supra note 34, at 242 (using Dickerson's example).
63 See Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J.
1855, 2021 (1985) (stating, in connection with the phrase any defendant who is out of
the jurisdiction, insane... [or] under the age of eighteen, "[b]ut technically, an
insane minor is not insane or under eighteen but both insane and under eighteen;
does the provision apply to him?").
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burial expenses), it would not be possible to cumulate
attributes-an expense cannot be both a hospital expense and a
burial expense. 64 But in [41] the adjectives are not mutually
exclusive, and there would be no basis for concluding, based
solely on the wording of the example, that an employee who is
both temporary and part-time would not fall within the scope of
[41a] and [41b]. In that respect, neither [41a] nor [41b] is
ambiguous-the issue of cumulation of attributes is extrinsic to
the meaning conveyed by [41].
One issue that [41] does not raise is ambiguity associated
with or-the ambiguity giving rise to [41a] and [41b] is that
engendered by plural nouns; 65 in both [41a] and [41b] the or is
exclusive; 66 and the question of cumulation of attributes does not
involve or.
The flawed understanding of or that is to be found in the
literature on legal drafting may well have originated in
Dickerson's analysis of adjectives linked by or. His was the first
detailed analysis of the ambiguity of or from a drafting
perspective, 67 and his analysis focuses on use of or with
adjectives. Even though the ambiguity that he identifies-
whether actual (the ambiguity engendered by plural nouns) or
questionable (the question of cumulation of attributes)-has
nothing to do with or, he brings it under the umbrella of the
ambiguous or. It would seem that others then accepted this
flawed analysis as being applicable to or wherever it is used,
even outside the context of adjectives. (When a text on legal
drafting cites an authority on the ambiguous or, usually that
authority is Dickerson or someone who relies on Dickerson.)68
With this in mind, the misconceptions regarding or to be found in
the literature on drafting69 should not come as a surprise.
The question of cumulation of attributes is actually not a
pressing one, because it is an unlikely notion that one could not
64 See FLD2, supra note 33, § 6.2, at 111-12.
65 See supra text accompanying note 61.
66 See supra text accompanying note 59.
67 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., DICK, supra note 1, at 105 n.23 (citing Dickerson); GARNER, supra
note 1, at 624 (citing Kirk, supra note 34); Kirk, supra note 34, at 237 ("The most
readily available statement of these uncertainties [those involving use of and and
or], and of their subtleties and difficulties, is to be found in Professor Reed
Dickerson's landmark book, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting.").
69 See supra notes 33-35 and 52-55 and accompanying text.
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cumulate attributes. 70 With respect to [41], it would be difficult
to imagine a provision that is intended to encompass any given
temporary employee or part-time employee, but only if that
temporary employee is not also part time, and vice versa.
Examples [42] and [43] demonstrate the ambiguity that
actually arises in a provision using a plural noun modified by
adjectives that are joined by or. Just as [27] exhibits a greater
number of possible meanings than does [26], the ambiguity
associated with plural nouns71 results in [43] exhibiting a greater
number of possible meanings than does [42].
[42] Tango shall terminate the employment of Acme's
temporary or part-time employees.
[42a] Tango shall terminate the employment of those Acme
employees who are temporary or those Acme employees
who are part-time.
[42b] Tango shall terminate the employment of those Acme
employees who are temporary or part-time-in other
words, shall terminate the employment of all those Acme
employees who are temporary and all those Acme
employees who are part-time.
[43] Tango may terminate the employment of Acme's
temporary or part-time employees.
[43a] Tango may terminate the employment of no fewer than all
Acme employees who are temporary or no fewer than all
Acme employees who are part-time.
[43b] Tango may terminate the employment of one or more of
those Acme employees who are temporary or one or more of
those Acme employees who are part-time.
[43c] Tango may terminate the employment of no fewer than all
those Acme employees who are temporary and no fewer
than all those Acme employees who are part-time, but
Tango may not terminate all the employees in one group
without also terminating all the employees in the other
group.
[43d] Tango may terminate the employment of one or more of
those Acme employees who are temporary and may
70 See Leff, supra note 63, at 2021 (asking rhetorically whether the phrase any
defendant who is out of the jurisdiction, insane... [or] under the age of eighteen
applies to an insane minor, and responding "[o]f course it does, at least to any sane
interpreter").
71 See supra text following note 14.
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terminate the employment of one or more of those Acme
employees who are part-time.
An alternative to having a noun modified by two or more
adjectives is to repeat the noun for each adjective, as in [44].
This has the effect of eliminating the ambiguity exhibited by [41],
because one meaning that is not possible is that of [41a], namely
employees, each of whom is either temporary or part-time. The
only meaning conveyed is that of [41b]-employees who are
temporary or employees who are part-time. But due to the
ambiguity associated with plural nouns, 72 ambiguity would result
if [44] were used with language of discretion the way [41] is used
in [43].
[44] temporary employees or part-time employees
Dickerson states that an example similar to [44] conveys two
alternative meanings. 73  Applying his analysis to [44], the
question would be whether an employee who is both temporary
and part-time would fall within the scope of the example, or
whether instead the employee would have to be temporary or
part-time, but not both. But like [41a] and [41b], [44] does not
convey the latter meaning: the issue of cumulation of attributes
is extrinsic to the meaning conveyed by [44] .74
VI. "AND/OR"
Drafters sometimes use and/or to convey the meaning of the
inclusive or. Judges and legal-writing commentators have
fulminated against use of and/or,75 but it has gained greater
acceptance among general authorities. 76 It does, after all, have a
72 See supra example [5].
73 See FLD2, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 112-13.
74 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
75 See, e.g., DICK, supra note 1, at 107 (referring to and/or as a "linguistic
aberration"); HAGGARD, supra note 1, at 266 (noting that judicial outrage directed at
and/or "is fully warranted"); DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE (1992) ("Where precision is called for, and/or is a
disaster."); see also GARNER, supra note 1, at 56 (quoting the views of some "ardent
haters" of and/or); 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:12 (4th ed.
1990) [hereinafter WILLISTON] (noting that and/or "has provoked outbursts of
invective which are somewhat disproportionate to the amount of harm it causes").
76 See, e.g., CGEL, supra note 16, § 3.3, at 1329 (offering the example They're
inviting [Kim and/or Pat] and stating that and/or serves to block the implicature
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specific meaning-X and/or Y means X or Y or both. One could
use Acme may dissolve Subsidiary A and/or Subsidiary B as an
alternative to [13b]. (X, Y, and/or Z means X or Y or Z or any
two or more of them).
On the other hand, X or Y or both is generally clearer than
and/or. And drafters sometimes use and/or when the only
possible meaning is that conveyed by or: Acme shall incorporate
Subsidiary in Delaware and/or New York. On balance, it is best
to avoid and/or.
That said, in some contexts and/or is the most efficient way
to incorporate into a provision the concept of or both. An
example: Acme may sell widgets in the Roetown Store and/or one
or more of any other discount stores that Acme opens in the
Territory with the prior written approval of Widgetco, which
approval Widgetco may not unreasonably withhold. The best
alternative to and/or would be as follows: Acme may sell widgets
in the Roetown Store or one or more of any other discount stores
that Acme opens in the Territory with the prior written approval
of Widgetco, which approval Widgetco may not unreasonably
withhold, or in both the Roetown Store and one or more of any
such other discount stores. This alternative is wordier, and in
this context both is a little awkward, since it is best applied to
two homogeneous objects. 77
In any event, do not use and/or in language of obligation,
since it can be misleading. In the provision Acme shall hire Roe
and/or Doe, using and/or obscures the fact that Acme's
obligation would be satisfied by hiring either Roe or Doe. It
would be more precise to use or and append, if necessary, the
phrase and may hire both Roe and Doe.
that they're only inviting one of them, thereby "explicitly allowing for the situation
where they invite both Kim and Pat as well as that where they invite only one.");
WILLISTON, supra note 75, at § 30:12.
[R]egardless of how purists may feel about the term, it is fairly clear and
certain that where the term 'and/or' is used in a contract, the intention is
that the one word or the other may be taken accordingly as the one or the
other will best effect the purposes of the parties as gathered from the
contract as a whole.
Id.
77 FOWLER'S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 114 (R.W. Burchfield ed., 3d ed. 1996)
("In practice, both is almost always used with two homogenous words or
phrases .... ).
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VII. "AND... OR"
When in any string of three nouns (as in [45]), verbs,
adjectives, or adverbs the first and second are separated by and
and the second and third are separated by or, or vice versa, the
meaning varies depending on which conjunction "has scope over"
the other. 78 In [45], either or has scope over and (with the choice
being between Able and Baker on the one hand and Charlie on
the other) or and has scope over or (with the choice being
between Baker and Charlie). Enumeration, as in [45a] and [45b],
is the simplest way to eliminate this ambiguity. In addition,
when the second and third elements are separated by or, one can
use either to indicate that and has scope over or, as in [45c]. But
this sort of ambiguity appears only rarely in contracts.
[45] Acme shall hire Able and Baker or Charlie.
[45a] Acme shall hire (1) Able and Baker or (2) Charlie.
[45b] Acme shall hire (1) Able and (2) Baker or Charlie.
[45c] Acme shall hire Able and either Baker or Charlie.
VIII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Courts May Find Ambiguity Where None Exists
This article has shown that ambiguity associated with and
and or is considerably more subtle than the generalizations in
the literature on drafting suggest. Those generalizations have
the potential to cause a court to find ambiguity where linguistic
analysis would indicate none exists.
Consider the case of SouthTrust Bank v. Copeland One,
L.L.C.79 Defendant SouthTrust operated an automated teller
machine, or "ATM," at an Alabama mall. It did so under a lease
with the landlord, Copeland One, that provided in pertinent part
as follows: '"Tenant [SouthTrust] shall have the exclusive right
during the term of this lease and any renewals to operate an
ATM or any other type of banking facility on the Property."80
SouthTrust also operated a branch bank at the mall.8 ' Shortly
before the end of the lease for the branch premises, Copeland
78 See CGEL, supra note 16, § 1.2, at 1279-80.
79 886 So. 2d 38 (Ala. 2003).
8o Id. at 39.
81 See id.
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One and another bank entered into a new lease, and Copeland
One informed SouthTrust that it would have to vacate the
branch premises at the end of the existing lease.8 2 SouthTrust
did so and opened its branch at a new location.8 3 It then notified
Copeland One that under the exclusive-use provision of the ATM
lease, SouthTrust had the exclusive right to operate a branch
bank at the mall.8 4
Copeland One filed a complaint seeking a judgment
declaring the parties' rights under the ATM lease.8 5 The lower
court found in favor of Copeland One, holding that the ATM lease
was ambiguous and should be construed against SouthTrust, the
drafter.8 6 SouthTrust appealed, and in its analysis, the Alabama
Supreme Court cited Bryan A. Garner's A Dictionary of Modern
Legal Usage,8 7 which offers the problematic analysis of the
inclusive and exclusive or that is enshrined in the literature on
legal drafting.88 The court seemed to assume that every instance
of or carries within it an exclusive and an inclusive meaning-it
concluded that the ATM lease provision was ambiguous, in that
it could be interpreted to mean either (1) that SouthTrust had
the exclusive right to operate an ATM at the mall or the
exclusive right to operate any other type of banking facility at the
mall, or the exclusive right to operate both or (2) that SouthTrust
had the exclusive right to operate an ATM at the mall or to
operate any other type of banking facility at the mall, but did not
have the exclusive right to operate both an ATM and any other
type of banking facility at the mall. 9 Because SouthTrust
drafted the ATM lease, the court construed the ATM lease
against SouthTrust and held that meaning (2) applied.90
The ATM lease was not, however, ambiguous. The provision
of the ATM lease at issue is analogous to [34], and the only
reasonable interpretation is that conveyed by (2). The court
opted for the correct meaning, but for the wrong reasons.
82 Id. at 40.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 40-41.
87 GARNER, supra note 1.
88 See SouthTrust, 886 So. 2d at 42; see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
89 SouthTrust, 886 So. 2d at 42-43.
90 Id. at 43.
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The lesson in this for drafters is that it might not be enough
to draft provisions that, in linguistic terms, are unambiguous,
since courts may be willing to apply uncritically the flawed
analysis of ambiguity contained in the literature on drafting. In
other words, even though a provision may be unambiguous, in
sensitive contexts, it may be appropriate to rule out the
possibility of any alternative meaning.
One could seek to accomplish this by using either... or. For
instance, even though [34] is unambiguous as is, one could revise
it to read, Acme may dissolve either Subsidiary A or Subsidiary
B-adding either strengthens the implication that Acme may
only dissolve one of the subsidiaries. 91 But to convey the same
meaning expressly, use but not both.92
This belt-and-suspenders approach could also reduce the
chances of a court unwarrantedly replacing an and with an or, or
vice versa. Courts are quick to make such a change if they think
that doing so would better reflect the intent of the parties,93 and
such changes are not always justified.94
B. Minding Your "Ands" and "Ors," and Supplementing Them
It would seem that what actually underlay the dispute in the
SouthTrust case was not ambiguity. Instead, whoever drafted
the ATM lease was not aware what meaning or would convey in
this context. Because the exclusivity provision was contained in
an ATM lease, it is unlikely that the meaning conveyed by that
provision was the meaning that had been intended, since that
91 See CGEL, supra note 16, § 2.3, at 1307.
Either emphasises that one of the coordinates must obtain, and tends to
strengthen the exclusive implicature that only one of them does. 171 be
seeing her on either Friday or Saturday conveys somewhat more strongly
than the version without either that I'll be seeing her on just one of these
days. Exclusiveness nevertheless is still only an implicature ....
Id.
92 See id. § 2.2.1, at 1297 (noting that "the implicature [of exclusiveness] can be
made explicit in a but-coordinate: He'l invite Kim or Pat, but not both").
93 See GARNER, supra note 1, at 55 (stating how "[s]loppy drafting sometimes
leads courts to recognize that and in a given context means or," and referring to "the
opposite mistake"); see, e.g., People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 758 (Cal. 1985) ("The
inadvertent use of 'and' where the purpose or intent of a statute seems clearly to
require 'or' is a familiar example of a drafting error which may properly be rectified
by judicial construction.").
94 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 46 (1993) (stating that
in some cases courts construe and as meaning or, and vice versa, without there
being any apparent linguistic basis for doing so).
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would have meant that the ATM would have had to have been
removed and the ATM lease and its exclusivity provision
terminated if SouthTrust wished to open another banking
facility.
Given the choice of using the word and or using the word or
in the ATM lease provision, SouthTrust would have been advised
to opt for and. Simply replacing or with and-"Tenant
[SouthTrust] shall have the exclusive right.., to operate an
ATM or [read and] any other type of banking facility on the
Property"-would have resulted in actual ambiguity of the sort
exhibited by [13]. But of the two possible meanings, the more
likely would have been that sought by SouthTrust, namely what
the court offered as meaning (1) of the ATM lease provision. A
better solution, however, would have been to eliminate this
ambiguity by having the provision read "the exclusive right.., to
operate an ATM and, at its discretion, any other type of banking
facility on the Property."
In these respects, the SouthTrust case is illustrative of two
principles. The first is that it is commonplace for drafters to
mistakenly use and instead of or, and vice versa.95 An example:
"Each of the Selling Stockholders shall notify the Purchaser of
any updates to the representations in section 3.1 or [read and]
3.2." Courts have often shown themselves willing to read and
instead of or, or vice versa, in a contract provision when that
would better reflect the intent of the parties,96 but a drafter
cannot count on a court to do so. Instead, a drafter should take
care in choosing between and and or, particularly in sensitive
provisions.
The second principle is that instead of simply opting for and
or or and tolerating any ambiguity associated with one's choice,
in sensitive contexts you should eliminate that ambiguity by
using language of the sort reflected in the italicized,
unambiguous examples in this article. To exercise such control
over meaning, a drafter needs to understand how the ambiguity
associated with and and or manifests itself.
95 See GARNER, supra note 1, at 55 (noting that "and is frequently misused for
or where a singular noun, or one of two nouns, is called for," and noting that the
opposite mistake-or for and-also occurs).
9 See supra note 93.
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C. On Seeking to Eliminate Every Ambiguity
It would be unreasonable to expect drafters to attempt to
eliminate all instances of ambiguity associated with and or or.
Consider [46] and [47]. Each example is ambiguous, but anyone
inclined to recommend that a drafter restructure them to
eliminate the ambiguity should consider two factors. First, of the
two possible meanings of each example, one is clearly the most
natural, namely [46a] and [47a]. Second, given the extra
verbiage required to avoid ambiguity, prose stylists would likely
steer clear of [46a] and [47a], while drafters in a hurry would be
oblivious to these alternatives. Whether to eliminate ambiguity
involves a balancing-whether conscious or not-of expediency
and risk, and one should not be surprised if often enough in a
given contract expediency trumps risk, and defensibly so.
[46] The Seller has complied with all laws applicable to the
Business and the Acquired Assets.
[46a] The Seller has complied with all laws applicable to the
Business and all laws applicable to the Acquired Assets.
[46b] The Seller has complied with all laws applicable to both
the Business and the Acquired Assets.
[47] The Seller has complied with all laws applicable to the
Business or the Acquired Assets.
[47a] The Seller has complied with all laws applicable to the
Business and all laws applicable to the Acquired Assets.
[47b] The Seller has complied with all laws applicable to the
Business or all laws applicable to the Acquired Assets, but
not both sets of laws.
Although and expresses conjunction and or expresses
disjunction,97 they can serve to convey the same meaning: [46a]
and [47a] are identical. Likewise, in the case of This power of
attorney will survive Smith's death [and] [or] incompetence, in
both cases the most natural meaning is This power of attorney
will survive Smith's death and will survive Smith's incompetence.
This phenomenon arises when the relevance of two alternatives
depends not on the parties but on external factors. It adds an
ironic twist to analysis of ambiguity associated with and and or.
97 See supra text accompanying note 38.
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